The appendix is organized as follows: Appendix A: In this section, we prove IS functions are XOS. Appendix B: In this section, we formally prove our main results in Section 3. Appendix C: In this section, we formally prove our main results in Section 4. Appendix D: In this section, we introduce a milder efficiency requirement IO and study its compatibility with EF1. Appendix E: In this section, we discuss our experiments in more details. Regarding agents' utilities, FISP contains three cases, from the most special to the most general: Unweighted: u J, i.e., agents have unary utility for jobs. J, i.e., all jobs have unit processing time.

We initiate the study of a variant of the classic online speed scaling problem, in which machine learning predictions about the future can be integrated naturally.

In Multiagent Path Finding (MAPF), the goal is to compute efficient, collision-free paths for multiple agents navigating a network from their sources to targets, minimizing the schedule's makespan-the total time until all agents reach their destinations. We introduce a new variant that formally models scenarios where some agents may experience delays due to malfunctions, posing significant challenges for maintaining optimal schedules. Recomputing an entirely new schedule from scratch after each malfunction is often computationally infeasible. To address this, we propose a framework for dynamic schedule adaptation that does not rely on full replanning. Instead, we develop protocols enabling agents to locally coordinate and adjust their paths on the fly. We prove that following our primary communication protocol, the increase in makespan after k malfunctions is bounded by k additional turns, effectively limiting the impact of malfunctions on overall efficiency. Moreover, recognizing that agents may have limited computational capabilities, we also present a secondary protocol that shifts the necessary computations onto the network's nodes, ensuring robustness without requiring enhanced agent processing power. Our results demonstrate that these protocols provide a practical, scalable approach to resilient multiagent navigation in the face of agent failures.

We present a heuristic algorithm for solving the problem of scheduling plans of tasks. The plans are ordered vectors of tasks, and tasks are basic operations carried out by resources. Plans are tied by temporal, precedence and resource constraints that makes the scheduling problem hard to solve in polynomial time. The proposed heuristic, that has a polynomial worst-case time complexity, searches for a feasible schedule that maximize the number of plans scheduled, along a fixed time window, with respect to temporal, precedence and resource constraints.

The Young Physicists Tournament is an established team-oriented scientific competition between high school students from 37 countries on 5 continents. The competition consists of scientific discussions called Fights. Three or four teams participate in each Fight, each of whom presents a problem while rotating the roles of Presenter, Opponent, Reviewer, and Observer among them. The rules of a few countries require that each team announce in advance 3 problems they will present at the national tournament. The task of the organizers is to choose the composition of Fights in such a way that each team presents each of its chosen problems exactly once and within a single Fight no problem is presented more than once. Besides formalizing these feasibility conditions, in this paper we formulate several additional fairness conditions for tournament schedules. We show that the fulfillment of some of them can be ensured by constructing suitable edge colorings in bipartite graphs. To find fair schedules, we propose integer linear programs and test them on real as well as randomly generated data.

Security games involving the allocation of multiple security resources to defend multiple targets generally have an exponential number of pure strategies for the defender. One method that has been successful in addressing this computational issue is to instead directly compute the marginal probabilities with which the individual resources are assigned (first pursued by Kiekintveld et al. (2009)). However, in sufficiently general settings, there exist games where these marginal solutions are not implementable, that is, they do not correspond to any mixed strategy of the defender. In this paper, we examine security games where the defender tries to monitor the vertices of a graph, and we show how the type of graph, the type of schedules, and the type of defender resources affect the applicability of this approach. In some settings, we show the approach is applicable and give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal defender strategy; in other settings, we give counterexample games that demonstrate that the approach does not work, and prove NP-hardness results for computing an optimal defender strategy.